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The Sky’s the Limit
THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE
AND CLOUD COMPUTING
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you take a spontaneous trip across the border
to Canada, just for the night. You leave early the next morning
to return to the United States, but on the way back, agents
stop you at the border. You show them your passport, you
answer their questions, and you do not have a criminal
background. Yet, they search your car, look through your bags,
and seize your smartphone and wireless tablet. Then, you wait.
You may wait a few minutes or several hours. You may even
return to the United States without your gadgets, which will be
returned to you in several days.1 While this might all seem
unfair, border officials are nevertheless free to seize and search
electronics as they please.2
Now, what if border agents were to stop and search not
you but rather a sex offender returning from a trip to Asia,
where he loaded his laptop full of files of photographs and
videos of nude children?3 Or what if the person stopped and
searched had bookmarked a Google Doc,4 which contained
1

A simple search online reveals these types of border searches are not
uncommon. See, e.g., Katie Johnston, Laptop Seizures at Customs Cause Thorny Legal
Dispute, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 8, 2012), http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-08/business/
30601167_1_laptops-search-and-seizure-strip-searches (describing the experience of a man
who took his laptop to Mexico to get work done and had it seized and held for two months
at the Mexico-U.S. border while it was searched); Jane McLean, Readers Respond: Border
Crossing Stories, ABOUT.COM, http://gocanada.about.com/u/ua/faqscrossingtheborde1/
Border-Crossing-Horror-Stories-Share-Your-Border-Crossing-Horror-Stories.02.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2012) (compiling readers’ comments about their experiences at the
Canadian-U.S. border, mostly with regard to Canadian border officials).
2
Specifically, law enforcement at the border is able to search people and
property at the border without a warrant, probable cause, or suspicion. See infra Part
II. Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have expanded this power to data on electronic
devices. See infra Part II.A.
3
See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (one of many
cases where, upon returning from Asia—in Arnold’s case, the Philippines—American
border officials discovered child pornography during a search of a traveler’s computer).
4
Google Docs is a “Web-based word process[or]” that enables instant sharing
and storing of documents, presentations, or spreadsheets, which anyone in the group
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information about Improvised Explosive Devices and “jihadist
material”?5 These kinds of searches have become more common
in recent years. In fact, government officials searched the
electronic devices of more than 6500 people crossing the U.S.
border “between October 2008 and June 2010.”6 These devices
ranged from laptops to cellular phones and from external hard
drives to flash drives.7 By far, the device that officials searched
most frequently was the cellular phone.8 Moreover, as a result
of these searches, law enforcement might use the files they
discover as a basis for arresting or excluding these individuals
from the United States.9
Although the Fourth Amendment protects “against
unreasonable search and seizures,”10 the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has given U.S. officials broad
discretion to conduct warrantless searches at the border.11 In
August 2009, the agencies of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) both issued
directives that clarified what exactly this generalized power
entails.12 Both directives permit border agents to inspect
using the document can edit from any Internet-capable device. Using Google Docs in
the Classroom: Simple as ABC, GOOGLE.COM, https://docs.google.com/View?docid=
dcdn7mjg_72nh25vq (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
5
See Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans
Returning from Overseas Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter S. Comm. Hearing on Laptop
Searches and Overseas Travel] (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Protection), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110shrg45091/html/CHRG-110shrg45091.htm.
6
Government Data About Searches of International Travelers’ Laptops and
Personal Electronic Devices, ACLU.ORG (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/government-data-about-searches-international-travelers-laptops-and-personalelectr [hereinafter ACLU, Government Data].
7
Id.
8
Id. During a “nine month period” in 2008, CBP “searched and seized 1,644
electronic devices.” Hugo Martin, No Curbs on Border Searches of Cellphones, Laptops,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 27, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/travel/
2011177028_trbordersearches28.html. Of these devices, “582 were cellphones, 398 were
laptop computers and 259 were digital cameras. The rest included MP3 players, flash
drives, hard drives, DVDs and other devices.” Id.
9
The discovery of “[t]hese materials have led to the refusal [of] admission
and the removal of these dangerous people from the United States.” S. Comm. Hearing
on Laptop Searches and Overseas Travel, supra note 5.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT],
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_laptop.pdf.
12
See generally U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049,
BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION (2009) [hereinafter
CBP DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/
elec_mbsa.ctt/elec_mbsa.pdf; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE
DIRECTIVE NO. 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter
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electronic devices, such as laptops and cellular phones, and
examine the information on those devices without any
“individualized suspicion.”13
The CBP and ICE derive their authority to conduct
these inspections from their respective missions to “interdict”
and “investigate violations of federal law at and related to the
Nation’s borders.”14 DHS has identified electronic storage of
data “as the latest method of smuggling . . . material” related to
criminal activity into the United States.15 Thus, a motivating
reason for allowing such broad latitude to search people and
their property at the border lies in preventing illegal activities,
such as “child pornography; human rights violations;
smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other contraband; financial
and trade-related crimes; violations of intellectual property
rights and law (e.g., economic espionage); . . . [and] violations of
immigration law,” as well as enforcing national security laws,
preventing terrorism, and protecting vulnerable infrastructure
from potential security threats.16
Nevertheless, opponents of border searches argue that
electronic devices contain much more information than
briefcases or luggage, which have historically been searched at
the border.17 Whereas in the past, a briefcase might have
contained work materials, notes, and some personal information,
the current availability, portability, and ease of electronic
storage means that travelers can carry “exponentially” more
private information with them at any given time.18 As such,
opponents argue that the potential invasion of privacy19 during
ICE DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_
electronic_devices.pdf.
13
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.1.2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 6.1.
14
DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 2.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 4.
17
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY’S POLICY 1-2 (2011).
18
DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 2. Nonetheless, as
Professor Nathan Alexander Sales pointed out, typical container ships carry between
5000 and 11,000 twenty-foot cargo containers, yet these container ships have always been
subjected to suspicionless border searches. Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border:
Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1111 (2009).
19
For example, in 2010, the ACLU, New York Civil Liberties Union, and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a lawsuit on behalf of the
National Press Photographers Association and Pascal Abidor, a French-American
citizen, challenging DHS’s electronic border search policy. Abidor was crossing the
Canada-America border by train when customs officers searched and confiscated his
laptop. His laptop was returned eleven days later, and there was evidence that
personal files, such as photographs and chats with his girlfriend, had been searched.
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border searches of electronic devices is far greater than during
border searches of nonelectronic items.20 For example, attorneys,
doctors, accountants,21 and journalists might travel across
borders with computers and other electronic devices that contain
privileged attorney-client, doctor-patient, or confidential-source
information.22 Nevertheless, one might also argue that briefcases
of such professionals—which have always been subject to
suspicionless border searches23—would also contain sensitive
materials. Therefore, other commentators contend that “[l]aptop
searches are not unique in their ability to reveal sensitive,
personal information.”24 They base this rationale on a history of
border searches that has revealed sensitive information, such
as situations where border officials have opened a sealed letter
within a package,25 looked through photo albums found within a
vehicle,26 and opened a sealed envelope found within a briefcase.27
The latest phenomenon in the computing world is the
virtualization of computing services—that is, shifting data and
services from local servers and hard drives to third-party
ACLU in Federal Court Today Challenging Government’s Searches of Laptops at
Border, ACLU.ORG (July 8, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclufederal-court-today-challenging-governments-searches-laptops-border.
20
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 1.
21
Although, in the past, these professionals might have carried privileged or
private information in their briefcase, data storage on electronic devices and on the
cloud enable individuals to indirectly transport significantly more information. For
instance, an article in the American Institute of CPAs’ Journal of Accountancy
describes CPA firms’ transition to electronic storage of data:
When we were doing the evaluation of the late 1990s, we had massive file rooms
to hold all of our tax files and audit workpaper files. If you go into a firm or a
business today, we don’t have file rooms. The file room is on a computer that is
the size of a small toaster. It’s amazing—that transition from hard copy to
electronic data . . . .
Kim Nilsen, Moving the Needle, J. ACCT. (Nov. 2011), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Issues/2011/Nov/20114396. Although the computer referred to is not necessarily
connected to the cloud, companies are beginning to transition from storing hard copies
of files to electronic storage, including electronic storage on third party servers. If a
traveler has access to these servers on their wireless devices and a search is conducted,
all of these files could potentially be viewed.
22
For example, border agents impounded the laptop of Bill Hogan, a
freelance journalist, upon his return to the United States from Germany. Fortunately,
Hogan did not use his laptop for work; however, if he did then he would need to inform
sources that the government had their information. Alex Kingsbury, Seizing Laptops
and Cameras Without Cause, U.S. NEWS (June 24, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/
national/articles/2008/06/24/seizing-laptops-and-cameras-without-cause.
23
See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
24
Sales, supra note 18, at 1115.
25
United States v. Seljan, 497 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en
banc granted, 512 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2008).
26
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2005).
27
United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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servers that users can access from anywhere.28 Software
developers, businesses, and private individuals all around the
world are beginning to use these virtual servers—known as the
cloud—and the services they provide.29 Cloud computing
generally embodies “computing services offered by a third party,
available for use when needed, that can be scaled dynamically in
response to changing needs.”30 Cloud users save and share their
information on remote servers, which third parties own and
operate and users access through the Internet.31 Any information
or programs that can be stored on a computer’s local hard drive
can also be stored on these remote servers.32 Cloud computing
was first referenced in 1996 in an MIT paper about the
Internet,33 but it did not launch into existence until 2007 when
Amazon began providing cloud-computing services.34
Although the majority of consumers are not familiar
with cloud computing, research found that 76 percent of
respondents of an NPD Group poll used cloud-computing
services, knowingly or unknowingly, within the past year.35 For
example, antispam email programs tend to be cloud services.36
Meanwhile, more than 500,000 individuals used Amazon’s
28

ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 4 (2009), available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf.
29
See JOTHY ROSENBERG & ARTHUR MATEOS, THE CLOUD AT YOUR SERVICE 2
(2011). Furthermore, in the proposed 2012 Federal Budget the Obama administration
suggested a “Cloud First Policy,” which would improve government IT inefficiencies
and the delivery of government services by “requiring agencies to evaluate safe, secure
cloud computing options before making any new investment.” See VIVEK KUNDRA,
FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY 2 (Feb. 8, 2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011).
30
ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 1.
31
GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 4.
32
Id.
33
ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 8; see Sharon Eisner Gillet &
Mitchell Kapor, The Self-Governing Internet: Coordination by Design, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 1997), available at http://ccs.mit.edu/papers/
CCSWP197/CCSWP197.html.
34
ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 8-9.
35
Andrew R. Hickey, Cloud Computing Befuddles Consumers, Despite Use:
Study, CRN.COM (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.crn.com/news/cloud/231300496/cloudcomputing-befuddles-consumers-despite-use-study.htm;jsessionid=gZmvvMv3r7Bf1qFfqyyOA**.ecappj01. The NPD Group found that “only 22 percent of consumers in
the U.S. are familiar with the term ‘cloud computing’” but “76 percent of U.S.
respondents used some form of Internet-based cloud service within the past year.” Id.
The NPD Group is a market research organization that provides “consumer and retail
information” to “more than 2000 manufactur[ing], retail, and service companies . . . .”
About NPD, NPD GROUP, https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/aboutnpd/ (last
visited Sept. 16, 2012).
36
BRIAN J.S. CHEE & CURTIS FRANKLIN, JR., CLOUD COMPUTING:
TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE UBIQUITOUS DATA CENTER 82 (2010).
TO
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cloud within the first eighteen months it was open to the
public.37 Companies with computer systems that operate on
private servers have also begun to shift their data to cloud
servers, which tend to be much less expensive.38 And individual
Internet consumers use cloud services through email, gaming,
tax preparation, video and photo sharing, and storing and
backing up data.39 Moreover, companies such as Verizon,
AT&T, and Time Warner Cable are beginning to acquire and
implement cloud services,40 which suggests that major
companies recognize the large-scale movement of data storage
to cloud servers, and that an increasing number of people will
become cloud users as customers of such companies.
Although travelers might be uncomfortable with
broadening the scope of the border search doctrine to cloud
computing, since it will diminish privacy rights at the border,
this note argues that the border search doctrine should, in fact,
apply to data stored on the cloud.41 The Supreme Court has not
yet addressed border searches of electronic devices. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has carved out a doctrine that gives the
federal government vast power to search the property of
individuals who cross the border attempting to enter the United
States.42 The U.S. Courts of Appeals have taken this breadth of
authorization and enlarged the scope of the border search
doctrine even further.43 Based on this expansion, this note will
demonstrate that it is only logical for courts to extend the border
search doctrine to virtual data as well as locally stored electronic
data. To do otherwise would undermine the path that courts
have already paved and would enable contraband, criminal
activity, and national security threats to breach our borders.
37

ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 2.
Id. at 6.
39
Hickey, supra note 35.
40
Andrew R. Hickey, Cloud Services: Carriers Want Cloud Control, CRN.COM
(July 25, 2011), http://www.crn.com/news/networking/231002498/cloud-services-carrierswant-cloud-control.htm.
41
What this note means by accessing the cloud at the border is this: certain
cloud servers are available with just one click. For example, a Google user might open
the Internet browser on his iPhone, BlackBerry, or other electronic device, and Google
might be the default page or it might be easily accessible through the browser’s
bookmarks. Often, users can store passwords so that once on Google’s web page, the
user might already be logged in to the site. If this is the case, that user has easy access
to his email, calendar, photographs, and documents. As a result, a customs officer could
access all of this information just as easily, with a single click.
42
See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
125-26 (1973) (discussing the Tariff Act of 1930, which gives Congress “plenary
power . . . to regulate imports” and to prevent contraband from entering the country).
43
See infra Part II.A.
38
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This note will describe developments in electronic data
storage and analyze how the border search doctrine applies to
information stored on the cloud. Part I reviews general Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence within the United States. In
addition, it focuses on the government’s access to information
that individuals voluntarily convey to third parties. Part II
examines an exception to the Fourth Amendment—the border
search doctrine. This part looks at the evolution of the border
search doctrine, the justification for and consequences of the
doctrine, and the federal courts’ treatment of computer and
electronic-device searches at international borders. Part III
explores cloud computing. It defines cloud computing, describes
how it works, and discusses its present role in technology. In
addition, this part illustrates the complexity that cloud
computing adds to border searches, since it could expand such
searches to information not already encompassed within
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV takes a closer look
at a third party’s access to given information and how this
relates to data stored on the cloud—that is, on a third party’s
server. It will question whether Fourth Amendment protection
should extend to data on the cloud. Finally, Part V analyzes
how the easy access to data on the cloud plays a role in border
searches, even when the data itself is not physically located at
the border. The note’s conclusion synthesizes cloud computing
and the border search doctrine, and it argues that government
officials can, in fact, legally access data stored on the cloud
during searches conducted at the border.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE

This section discusses the Fourth Amendment’s protection
and its exceptions. The Fourth Amendment is important in the
context of border searches because it typically protects people
within the United States from warrantless searches and
seizures.44 The jurisprudence surrounding the Fourth
Amendment, however, has resulted in a number of exceptions,
including one for searches at the border. This section begins by
introducing the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
standard for determining whether a search is unreasonable.
This section then distinguishes between situations where there
is an expectation of privacy and situations where there is not,
44

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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and thus between situations where information is protected by
the Fourth Amendment and those where it is not, respectively.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. When drafting the
Amendment, the Framers were particularly concerned about
warrants, abuse of power by new officers, and protecting the
home.45 The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.46

The reasonableness of a search depends on its nature and the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure.47
Where a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy
concerning a certain area, the reasonableness of a search of that
area depends on “the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted.”48 Moreover, searches
executed without a warrant or probable cause of wrongdoing
are “per se unreasonable” and prohibited by the Constitution.49
The Fourth Amendment primarily protects against
warrantless searches and seizures in one’s home.50 This is
because individuals expect items and information in their
homes to be preserved as private.51 But Fourth Amendment

45

Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L. J. 979, 1061 (2011).
46
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985). For example, there
is no expectation of privacy in information given to third parties:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citation omitted).
48
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
49
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
50
See United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376
(1971) (“[A] port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let alone neither
prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials
when his possession of them is discovered during such a search.”).
51
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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protection is not limited exclusively to one’s home.52 In Katz v.
United States, Justice Harlan’s concurrence53 laid out a two-part
test for determining whether an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy, particularly when outside one’s home: (1)
did the individual “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and (2) is the expectation of privacy “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’?”54 If both questions are
answered in the affirmative, then law enforcement may not
access, search, or seize the property or information expected to be
private, unless they have a warrant. If they take any of these
steps without a warrant, they would violate the person’s Fourth
Amendment rights.55 Courts may assess the extent to which a
search infringes upon an individual’s privacy by weighing various
factors, including the intention of the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment, the way in which the individual uses such location,
and “our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion.”56
In certain situations there is no expectation of privacy.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is
“no . . . expectation of privacy in information . . . voluntarily
[provided] to third parties.”57 For instance, a person who
deposits money in a bank has “no legitimate expectation of
privacy” in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”58
Similarly, there is no expectation of privacy in the phone
52

See id. (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. . . . [W]hat
[a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an areas accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.”).
53
Although this test comes from the concurring opinion of Katz, the Supreme
Court applies this test when determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have applied
the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation
occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
54
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case the Supreme
Court examined whether government-initiated recording of a conversation on a
telephone in a public telephone booth was a “search and seizure” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 348-49, 353. The Court held that electronic surveillance
of a telephone booth violates the Fourth Amendment because an individual making
such a phone call “assume[s] that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world.” Id. at 352.
55
See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The point is . . . that the
[telephone] booth is . . . a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”).
56
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
57
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
58
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (internal citations omitted).
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numbers a person dials.59 In Smith v. Maryland,60 the police,
without a warrant, asked a telephone company to install a pen
register61 on the defendant’s telephone number.62 By using the
pen register, the telephone company and police monitored the
phone numbers that the defendant dialed and determined that
he was calling the home of a woman he had robbed.63 Thereafter,
the defendant was indicted for robbery.64 He moved to suppress
the pen register evidence against him on the ground that it was
obtained without a warrant.65 The Supreme Court rejected his
argument and held that there is no right to privacy for phone
numbers.66 This is because typical users know that they must
turn over numerical information—such as phone numbers—to
the phone company and that the phone company has facilities
where they record this information for various purposes.67
There is an important distinction between Katz, where
the Court held that the government invaded a legitimate
expectation of privacy by listening to a telephone conversation,68
and Smith, where the “pen register[] [did] not acquire the
contents of [the] communication[]” but only acquired the actual
phone number dialed.69 Indeed, this distinction between the
content of information and mere identifying information that is
voluntarily turned over to third parties—such as phone
numbers dialed—dates back to Supreme Court cases from the
nineteenth century.70
59

See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
See id. at 735.
61
“A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone
is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether
calls are actually completed.” Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434
US. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
62
Id. at 737.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 743 (“[I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain a secret.”).
67
Id.
68
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
69
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (emphasis in original).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he government cannot engage in a warrantless search of the contents of sealed
mail, but can observe whatever information people put on the outside of mail, because
that information is voluntarily transmitted to third parties.”); Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight,
as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”
(emphasis added)).
60

2013]

CLOUD COMPUTING AT THE BORDER

673

In United States v. Forrester, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit extended this distinction to surveillance of
e-mail and IP addresses used for Internet communication.71 The
defendants in Forrester were indicted and arraigned for
conspiring to manufacture the drug Ecstasy.72 Their indictment
was partially based on evidence the government obtained by
monitoring one defendant’s Internet and e-mail activity.73 The
court held that the monitoring techniques were analogous to the
pen register used in Smith v. Maryland.74 As the court explained,
[E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the
to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the
websites they visit because they should know that this information is
provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific
purpose of directing the routing of information.75

An important factor considered by the court was that IP
addresses and to and from addresses in an Internet user’s e-mail
do not reveal anything more regarding the underlying contents
of communication than phone numbers do.76 The e-mail and IP
addresses do not indicate a message’s content or indicate the
particular pages of websites viewed.77 In fact, the court explicitly
stated that Forrester’s holding extends only to the “particular
techniques” used in that case “and does not imply that more
intrusive techniques or techniques that reveal more content
information are also constitutionally identical to the use of a pen
register.”78 As a result, it seems that phone numbers, addresses,
e-mail addresses, and IP addresses all fall outside the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection, and therefore, government
officials may monitor and search this “exterior” information
without violating constitutional rights.
II.

THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE

There are several exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement for conducting searches.
These exceptions include searches of items in plain view,79
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509-10.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 511.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
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searches by consent,80 searches “incident to a lawful . . . arrest”
when “it is reasonable to believe evidence . . . might be found,”81
searches
executed
during
exigent
circumstances
or
circumstances where law enforcement has probable cause to
believe a crime is being committed,82 and searches at an
international border or its functional equivalent.83 Furthermore,
“[t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’”84 This section focuses on the Fourth
Amendment exception at international borders or their
equivalent. It briefly traces the history of this exception and
then specifically examines government-issued guidelines and
the approaches various courts have employed, including the
Fourth Circuit’s refusal to exempt “expressive” items from the
broad border search power. The second part of this section
briefly examines the role that computer security, such as
passwords, plays in border searches.
Since the ratification of the Constitution, Congress and
the courts have recognized that government interests at
international borders weigh more heavily than individual
Fourth Amendment interests.85 The first Congress granted
border officials plenary power to conduct warrantless
searches.86 This power rests on the assumption that searches at

80

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991).
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82
See Wengert v. State, 771 A.2d 389, 394 (Md. 2001) (citing several Supreme
Court cases that held exigent circumstances are an exception to the Fourth Amendment).
83
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-74 (1973) (“Travellers
may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self
protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled
to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Examples of the functional equivalent to a U.S. border include “an
established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more
roads that extend from the border” or “an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after
a nonstop flight from Mexico City.” Id.
84
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
85
See id.
86
19 U.S.C. § 482 (2012).The statute states:
81

Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or
they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have
been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether
by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or
otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he
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the border are “qualitatively different” from searches within
the country. Indeed, border searches help prevent contraband
from entering the United States altogether.87 As a result,
“Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not
subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable
cause, or warrant . . . .”88 The government may conduct routine
border stops and searches at fixed checkpoints close to the
border,89 on boats in U.S. waters at seaports,90 and at
international airport terminals.91 Nonetheless, if the search
crosses the line between routine and nonroutine—such as
searching a person’s alimentary canal—CBP and ICE officials
must have reasonable suspicion for conducting that search.92
CBP and ICE directives have established guidelines for
conducting searches at the border.93 Although the CBP directive
provides guidelines for handling sensitive material found on
“electronic devices,” border agents are nonetheless free to
search through the contents of data stored on such devices.94 As
a letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson described the
process, “These [searches] include opening individual laptops;
reading documents saved on the devices; accessing email
accounts and reading through emails that have been sent and
received; examining photographs; looking through personal
calendars; and going through telephone numbers saved in
cellular phones.”95 Nevertheless, the ability to inspect the
content of material finds support from the Supreme Court’s

may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was
imported contrary to law . . . .
Id.
87

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 538.
Id. at 539; see also United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973)
(Ely, J., dissenting) (The court upheld the strip search of defendant at the border.
Dissent stated that this strip search was the type of inspection to “offend the
sensibilities of any decent citizen,” and the court should not “depart from its
established principles.”).
89
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
90
See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
91
An international airport is the “functional equivalent of a border” where
flights arriving from foreign jurisdictions are concerned. Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S 266, 273 (1973).
92
See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. The respondent was convicted
of unlawful importation of cocaine after inspectors discovered that she had swallowed
eighty-eight balloons filled with cocaine. Id. at 536.
93
See generally CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12.
94
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.6.
95
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 4.
88
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acceptance of border officials opening first-class mail without a
warrant and with “less than probable cause.”96
Although searches should typically be conducted in the
presence of the traveler, in certain situations, searches may be
conducted outside his or her presence.97 Indeed, CBP permits its
agents to conduct searches that last up to five days before
requiring approval, make copies of searched information, and
transfer devices or copies of information to other federal
agencies if technical assistance is required.98 ICE allows
searches to last as long as thirty days before requiring
approval.99 If a search is conducted away from the immediate
vicinity of the border, then that search’s legality is determined
by considering the totality of the circumstances, which includes
the time that has elapsed since the searched item was at the
border, the distance from the border, and the manner of the
search.100 Nonetheless, the border search doctrine is still
“guided . . . by reason and practicality, not inflexible rules of
time and space.”101
A.

The Court’s Approach to Border Searches

The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the role of
computers and other electronic devices in the border search
doctrine.102 In the past decade, however, federal circuit courts
have addressed this issue and held that searches of computers
and electronic devices at the border do not require reasonable
suspicion.103 In United States v. Arnold,104 for example, the Ninth
96

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.1.4; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.1.
98
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.3.
99
ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.3.
100
See United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Nichols, 560 F.2d 1227, 1228 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Rodriguez-Alvarado, 510 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1975).
101
United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (“Although the Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the search of
computer equipment at the border, other federal courts have agreed that such searches
do not require reasonable suspicion.”).
103
See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007); Bunty, 617 F.
Supp. 2d at 365.
104
Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005. Arnold arrived at Los Angeles International
Airport from a flight from the Philippines and was selected for secondary questioning,
where CBP officials asked him to power on his computer. Id. CBP officials then opened
photograph files on Arnold’s laptop, in which they found pictures of nude women. Id. A
continued search of his photographs led to what officials believed was child
97
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Circuit discussed the types of items the government may
legally search at the border.105 These items include places where
a traveler attempts to conceal objects, such as “the contents of a
traveler’s briefcase and luggage, . . . a traveler’s ‘purse, wallet, or
pockets,’. . . papers found in containers such as pockets, . . . [and]
pictures, films and other graphic materials.”106 At the border, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect these items—that is,
“particularized suspicion” is not required for these items to be
searched.107 Even so, there is a point where searches of these
items become unreasonable.108 But the Supreme Court has left
unclear whether and when “a border search might be deemed
‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in
which it is carried out.”109 Indeed, in United States v. Vance,110
the Ninth Circuit applied a sliding scale and held that “as [a]
search becomes more intrusive [to the human body], more
suspicion is [required].”111 But the Supreme Court subsequently
clarified that this sliding-scale test does not apply to searches
of vehicles at the border.112
One court has found that computer searches are more
similar to vehicle searches than to the search of a person at the
border.113 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that
“reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to
search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at
the border,” and accordingly, the sliding-scale test does not
apply.114 Thus, it is much more difficult to determine when a
search of an electronic device crosses the line from reasonable

pornography. Id. Although Arnold argued that a computer is similar to a home,
because individuals store personal documents on their laptops, much like they do in
their homes, the court rejected this argument and refused to distinguish a “laptop and
its electronic contents . . . from . . . travelers’ luggage . . . .” Id. at 1006, 1009. The court
held that “reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or
other personal electronic storage devices at the border.” Id. at 1008.
105
Id. at 1007.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (1977).
109
Id. at 618 n.13; United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004).
110
62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995).
111
Id.
112
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
113
United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“The
Defendant would have this Court impute the same level of privacy and dignity afforded
to the sovereignty of a person’s being to an inanimate object like a computer. The Court
finds this argument without merit. . . . [T]his Court cannot equate the search of a
computer with the search of a person. The Court finds that the search of a computer is
more analogous to the search of a vehicle and/or its contents.”).
114
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
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to unreasonable.115 To add to this difficulty, the Ninth Circuit
did not distinguish between a closed container, such as a
briefcase, and an electronic device.116 In fact, the court treated
them the same.117 Various courts, when referring to Arnold,
have reinforced this treatment by holding that “[a] computer is
entitled to no more protection than any other container.”118
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit refused to carve out a
border search exception for computers based on the First
Amendment.119 In United States v. Ickes, a customs inspector
searched Ickes’s van as he entered the United States from
Canada.120 CBP officials searched his vehicle and found his
computer, which contained child pornography.121 Ickes then
challenged his conviction for transporting child pornography by
arguing that the search of his computer was unconstitutional
because “expressive” items are exempt from the border search
doctrine.122 The court, however, rejected this argument.123 It
reasoned that a principal justification for the border search
doctrine is to give the United States the ability to protect itself.124
“Terrorist communications,” which can be stored on electronic
devices, “are inherently expressive.”125 Therefore, if the court held
for the defendant’s asserted legal analysis, then the precedent
would undermine one of the essential goals of border security—
preventing terrorism.126

115

See United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“Customs Officers exercise broad authority to conduct routine searches and seizures
for which the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant, consent, or reasonable
suspicion. . . . Data storage media and electronic equipment, such as films, computer
devices, and videotapes, may be inspected and viewed during a reasonable border
search.” (citations omitted)).
116
Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (The defendant “failed to distinguish how the
search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any different from the
suspicionless border searches of travelers’ luggage that the Supreme Court and we
have allowed.”).
117
Id. at 1009-10.
118
People v. Endacott, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 909 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2008);
see also United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (“Courts have
uniformly agreed that computers should be treated as if they were closed containers.”).
119
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005).
120
Id. at 502.
121
Id. at 503.
122
Id. at 506.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126
Additionally, a Pennsylvania court has held that government officials may
search computer equipment found in luggage without reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
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The Ninth Circuit has held that “the government must be
reasonably certain that the object of a border search has crossed
the border [in order] to conduct a valid border search.”127 As a
result, in the context of border searches of devices that contain
information stored remotely on the cloud, courts must first
address a threshold question: does the border search doctrine
apply to data stored on servers that are not physically located at
the border? In other words, can border officials access virtually
stored information, or is a virtual inspection unreasonable?
B.

The Role of Computer Security

Although circuit courts have not explicitly addressed the
role that passwords play when conducting a border search, it
seems possible that password security does little to actually
prevent border officials from searching electronic devices. For
example, as the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas found, “A password on a computer does not automatically
convert a routine search into a non-routine search. A password
is simply a digital lock.”128 Luggage and briefcases usually have
locks, yet they are “subject to ‘routine’ searches at ports of entry
all the time.”129 In United States v. Bunty, border agents simply
asked the defendant to provide them with the passwords to two
laptop computers and informed him that his refusal would lead
the government to hire someone else to access the contents of
the computers.130 After the defendant challenged the legality of
the search, the district court held that nothing indicated that
the search of the computer was any different from a routine
computer search at the border.131
In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court and held that border officials in
Arizona lawfully searched the contents of Howard Cotterman’s
computer, even though the border agents detained and
transported the computer to a forensic computer laboratory 170
miles away.132 At first, officials were limited in what they could
127

United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We have held the
government must be reasonably certain that the object of the border search has crossed
the border to conduct a valid border search.” (citing United States v. Corral-Villavicencio,
753 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Garcia, 415 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1969))).
128
United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
129
Id. (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154-55 (2004)).
130
Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
131
Id. at 365.
132
637 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011).
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inspect on the computer because “many of [the] files were
password protected.”133 After Cotterman failed to provide the
passwords, however, an ICE official “bypass[ed] [the] computer
security and open[ed] twenty-three of the password protected
files.”134 Without addressing the legality of the particular act of
bypassing the password protection, the court held that the
search of the computer files was lawful.135
These cases support law enforcement’s power to search
files stored on a traveler’s computer and electronic devices at the
border without a warrant or reasonable suspicion.136
Additionally, they suggest that computer searches are lawful
even if the devices or files are protected by security features.137 In
the last several years, technological innovations have led more
and more people to store data in places other than their hard
drives, such as external and third-party servers. If these files are
password protected, what does it mean for agents at the border?
III.

THE MECHANICS OF THE CLOUD

Cloud computing is “the sharing or storage by users of
their own information on remote servers owned or operated by
others and accessed through the Internet or other connections.”138
“Any information [that can be] stored locally on a computer,” such
as on a hard drive, can also be stored on the cloud.139 “Cloud
computing . . . is physically limitless,” since it “can . . . be accessed
by users ‘on demand’ from virtually anywhere with an Internet
connection with minimal administrative effort.”140 Google’s free email service, Gmail, is an example of cloud computing.141 This
133

Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1073.
135
Id. at 1070.
136
In Romm, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the “internet cache” on
the defendant’s computer, and held that customs agents could gain access to this data
through the border search doctrine. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir.
2006). The court defined Internet cache as “a set of files on the user’s hard drive” that
are “kept by a web browser to avoid having to download the same material repeatedly.
Most web browsers keep copies of all the web pages that you view, up to a certain limit,
so that the same images can be redisplayed quickly when you go back to them.” Id. at
993 n.1 (quoting DOUGLAS DOWNING ET AL., DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET
TERMS 149 (Barron’s 8th ed. 2003)).
137
See e.g., United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (W.D. Tex. 2008);
United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1070.
138
GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 4. There is debate about this definition. Id. at 4 n.1.
139
Id.
140
Tip of the Month: Managing the Risks of Cloud Computing, MAYER BROWN
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=10088&nid=6.
141
Id.
134
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“means that any user’s email ‘mailbox’ may actually be stored in
one of several different servers located all over the world and can
easily be accessed from anywhere on the Internet.”142
In order for the cloud to operate, basic technology and
infrastructure are required.143 The “cloud needs servers on a
network, and [these servers] need a home.”144 The physical
home of these servers is called the data center.145 Companies
like Google, Amazon, and Microsoft “have . . . built up . . . ‘mega
data centers’ [comprising] thousands of servers.”146 These large
companies usually build data centers in geographic regions
where server use is high and where there is easy access to
inexpensive power, like in the Northwest.147 Cloud consumers
may or may not know the actual location of the data center
they are using.148 Additionally, it is possible to simultaneously
store data in multiple places at one time.149
Cloud services can be used for a number of different
reasons by both business organizations and individual users.
For example, the New York Times needed to convert eleven
million archived articles into PDF files in order to make them
accessible online.150 It estimated that this would require
“hundreds of servers,”151 at least four terabytes152 of storage, and
“a months-long delay.”153 So instead of undertaking this project
142

Id.
Cloud computing also requires virtualized servers, “an access API,”
storage, a database, and “elasticity as a way to expand and contract applications.”
ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 19. The API is the way to access the cloud; it
is “what the dashboard and controls are to a car.” Id. at 27.
144
Id. at 19.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 19-20.
147
Id. at 20.
148
GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 19.
149
Id. at 18. The locations of some data centers, however, are available. See
e.g., Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/
locations/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (providing a map with the locations of
its data centers around the world). Microsoft and Yahoo! built data centers in Quincy,
Washington. ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 22.
150
CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 77.
151
Id.
152
A terabyte is a unit of computer data space:
143

A Terabyte is approximately one trillion bytes, or 1,000 Gigabytes. . . . To put it
in some perspective, a Terabyte could hold about 3.6 million 300 Kilobyte images
or maybe about 300 hours of good quality video. A Terabyte could hold 1,000
copies of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Ten Terabytes could hold the printed
collection of the Library of Congress.
Megabytes, Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are
http://www.whatsabyte.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
153
CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 77.

They?,

WHAT’S

A
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on its own, the New York Times employed a cloud service,
Amazon Web Services, which, for $240, was able to process the
conversion of eleven million files and store four terabytes of
data by the next day.154 As evidenced by the New York Times,
companies are beginning to use (or have been using) cloud
services like “computing and storage to smooth out usage
spikes and avoid upgrading data centers to size capacity for
spikes rather than ‘normal’ usage.”155 On the other hand,
individual users most often encounter and use the cloud for
data storage.156 If a person’s computer crashes but that user’s
information is also stored on the cloud, then that person can
access the data from a different computer. Unlike with the local
hard drive, data is not lost forever.
Google, in particular, has advanced “the technological
bounds of cloud computing for more than [a decade].”157 Google
offers a variety of free online applications located in the cloud,158
which are designed to “divorce” users from desktop operating
systems.159 Through Google, users can “check [their] Gmail, type
up a memo on Google docs, manage [their] photos with Picasa,
read all [their] favorite sites with Google Reader, and store it
all on Google’s servers—allowing [the user] to access it from
any computer”160 or Internet-capable device—even a cell phone.
Instead of providing a separate cloud storage system,
“Google . . . provid[es] storage through [its applications].”161
Interestingly, Google visitors can go into “incognito” mode
while using Google’s web browser, Chrome.162 Incognito mode
does not record the sites that Chrome users visit on their hard
drives; nevertheless, the sites visited are still recorded on the
server.163 Google does not own the data that business
154

Id.
Id. at 78.
156
Id. at 80.
157
Cloud Computing Benefits: Top Ten Advantages of Google’s Cloud,
NEXIO.COM, http://googleapps.nexio.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=62&Itemid=229&lang=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
158
Brian Braiker, The Cloud’s Chrome Lining, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2008, 8:00
PM), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/01/the-cloud-s-chromelining.html.
159
CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 125.
160
Braiker, supra note 158.
161
CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 81.
162
Braiker, supra note 158.
163
Id. By virtue of the fact that users are employing incognito mode, they
must be surfing websites that they expect to remain private. This prompts an
interesting question: If border officials do have access to data on the cloud through the
border search doctrine, and since the incognito sites are recorded on Google’s server, do
border officials have access to these incognito websites when they conduct a search?
155
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organizations and individuals store on Google’s cloud.164
Accordingly, Google will not share data, except as noted in its
privacy policy. There, Google states that it will share a user’s
information if, among other reasons:
[Google has] a good-faith belief that access, use, preservation or
disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary to . . . meet any
applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental
request[,] . . . . enforce applicable Terms of Service, including
investigation of potential violations[,] . . . . detect, prevent, or
otherwise address fraud, security or technical issues[, or] . . . .
protect against harm to the rights, property or safety of Google, [its]
users or the public as required or permitted by law.165

Furthermore, users may remove data from Google’s cloud at will.166
Another preeminent cloud service provider, Amazon,
offers a variety of cloud web services for both business and
personal use.167 Amazon S3 is a “Simple Storage Service”168 that is
frequently encountered by individual users and is “available for
just about every [computer] operating system.”169 Amazon S3
has a simple interface and enables users to store and access
“any amount of data, at any time, from anywhere on the web.”170
According to Amazon Web Services (AWS), “AWS data
centers are housed in nondescript facilities, and critical
facilities have extensive setback and military grade perimeter
control berms as well as other natural boundary protection.”171
Users of AWS must provide Amazon with information related
to the content of their data on the cloud, in order to ensure
compliance, and Amazon “may monitor the external interfaces”

164

Security First, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/business/
infrastructure_security.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
165
Privacy Center, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last
modified July 27, 2012).
166
Dan Rowinski, How Does Google Protect Your Data in the Cloud?,
READWRITE (July 22, 2011), http://readwrite.com/2011/07/22/how_does_google_protect_
your_data_in_the_cloud (“Google promises that data can be taken out of the cloud at
any time and promises that it will be completely eradicated within 60 days (though
usually much sooner).”).
167
For a detailed description of Amazon Web Services (AWS), see About AWS,
AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/what-is-aws/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
For a detailed description of all of the services that AWS offers, see Products & Services,
AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/products/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
168
CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 80.
169
Id.
170
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
171
Amazon Web Services: Overview of Security Processes, AMAZON WEB
SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/articles/1697 (last updated Sept. 4, 2012).
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of that content172—language that seems to parallel the
monitoring techniques of telephone companies. But Amazon
will not monitor the actual content of the data.173 In fact, its
terms of service permit users to encrypt such data so that it
remains confidential.174 With respect to users’ privacy, Amazon
“release[s] account and other personal information when [it]
believe[s] release is appropriate to comply with the law.”175 It
seems that information users provide to Amazon, such as when
they “search, buy, post, participate in a contest or
questionnaire, or communicate with customer service,”176 is the
type of information collected and potentially shared by Amazon
with law enforcement.
Cloud computing is a “$150 billion phenomenon,”177 and
it is becoming more ubiquitous.178 The essential benefit of cloud
computing—and data storage in particular—is that information
can be accessed from any location. Nationwide retail businesses
can back up their inventory data from anywhere,179 a team
working on one document or project can collaborate on it from
different locations and on different operating systems,180 and
retail consumers can store credit-card information online and
use it to pay for merchandise in a few simple clicks.181
If the border search doctrine allows border security
agents to access data saved on the cloud, it will enable
government officials to reach into an area uncomfortable for
172
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many—for example, private pictures or appointments on a
calendar, diary entries, and confidential work information, to
name a few. Extending the border search doctrine poses the
same risks that the circuit courts disregarded by allowing border
officials to search electronic devices.182 These risks are even
greater with the prevalence of smartphones, which are Internetready and provide easy access to virtual servers, e-mail, creditcard information, and work-related documents. Officials will be
able to access virtual calendars and address books, inventory
data, archived business information,183 photos, chats, and other
sensitive information that is not necessarily stored locally on
an electronic device. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, the
interests of the U.S. government tend to outweigh the privacy
rights of individuals at the border, and it may be difficult to
establish an appropriate area to draw the line.184
IV.

DOES SMITH V. MARYLAND APPLY TO CLOUD
COMPUTING?

An examination of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith v. Maryland and its application to cloud computing
indicate that data stored on the cloud should be protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Smith v. Maryland stands for the idea
that individuals have “no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information [they] voluntarily turn over to third parties.”185 As a
result, government efforts to access that information are “not a
‘search’” under the Fourth Amendment.186 In the context of
cloud computing, this case is helpful in analyzing whether
users have a legitimate expectation of privacy in information
they store on the cloud, given that these users similarly turn
over information to the third-party service providers who own
and operate the servers.
The answer to this question is important to determining
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection available to cloud
users. If these users have no legitimate expectation of privacy,
then data stored on the cloud would not receive Fourth
Amendment protection, regardless of whether that information
is accessed within the United States or at an international
182

For a discussion of the case law surrounding the border search doctrine
and how it applies to electronic devices, see supra Part II.
183
See supra note 179.
184
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985).
185
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
186
Id. at 746.

686

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

border. But if these users have a legitimate expectation of
privacy, then the Fourth Amendment should protect such data
from being searched without a warrant, unless such search
falls under an exception—for example, the border exception.
This note asserts that the facts of Smith v. Maryland
are distinguishable from the cloud-computing context because,
unlike the phone numbers acquired by the pen register, users
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information they
store on the cloud. Indeed, the Smith court drew a critical
distinction between government interventions that capture the
content of a phone conversation, such as the wiretap at issue in
Katz v. United States,187 and government investigations that
merely access information conveyed to a third party, such as
the phone numbers at issue in Smith. Pursuant to this
distinction, data stored on the cloud would seem closely
analogous to the information in Katz. As a result, it would be
inappropriate to exclude that information from Fourth
Amendment protection.
As mentioned above, courts have routinely held that
information conveyed to a third party—that is, mere external
information—is not information that individuals expect to
remain private.188 Rather, because an individual or business
organization furnishes information to a third party, that
individual or organization loses its expectation of privacy in the
information.189 As such, government officials can access that
information, even in the absence of a warrant, because
obtaining it would not constitute a search.190
Admittedly, when users store files and data on thirdparty cloud services, they are furnishing information to third
parties. While cloud service providers are very similar to
telephone companies and the services they offer, cloudcomputing encompasses the disclosure of information that is
different in kind from the information provided to telephone
companies in Smith.
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Telephone and cloud services both provide a means of
communication. The cloud provides a means of communication
via e-mail communication, as well as a means of accessing one’s
own data from various locations—essentially communicating
with oneself. Telephone service providers keep records of call
logs and phone numbers dialed. But these phone service
providers do not typically record or eavesdrop on phone
conversations.191 Similarly, it is not necessary for cloud service
providers to examine the content of users’ data. Service
providers may keep records of how much data an individual or
organization stores on the cloud and the bandwidth each user
consumes, but this is most likely for billing purposes.192 Cloud
service providers may even record the kinds of data users store
on the cloud for marketing or development purposes. It
appropriately follows that the only information that cloud users
voluntarily convey to third parties is the amount of data they
are storing and the types of files being stored. Users are not
voluntarily conveying the content of their information to third
parties, and so users never relinquish their expectation of
privacy regarding such content. Thus, the content of the
information stored on the cloud is much more similar to the
content of the phone conversation in Katz. Therefore, the
Fourth Amendment should still protect the content of users’
data from being searched in the absence of a warrant.
Cloud computing is distinguishable from the situation of
United States v. Miller,193 where government officials were
permitted to access the content of financial information.194
Unlike cloud service providers, banks play an active role in the
content of the information that individuals provide to them. A
depositor goes to the bank with the intention of depositing
money. The depositor hands over a check to a bank teller or
inserts a check into an ATM. That teller or machine reads the
content of the check to determine the exact amount being
deposited and then deposits that amount into the depositor’s
bank account. Unlike the mere recording of dialed phone
191
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numbers by telephone service providers, it is the job of the
bank to account for the contents of a user’s bank account and to
provide the bank user with the fluctuations in his or her stock
portfolio. Whereas phone companies keep track of the numbers
dialed and e-mail service providers keep track of to and from
email addresses,195 banks do not just focus on who wrote the
check and who is depositing it. Instead, they also carefully
examine what the check says—including the amount to be
transferred—in order to fulfill their obligations to deposit the
check, transfer funds, and monitor the depositor’s account.
As discussed, cloud users do not voluntarily convey the
content of their data to cloud service providers, and so the
holding of Smith v. Maryland does not apply to virtual
information. As a result, the Fourth Amendment protects
information stored on the cloud, and government officials may
not access that information without a warrant. Nevertheless,
the question remains: does this data come under an exception?
More specifically, may law enforcement access this data
without a warrant if an individual carries an electronic device
across an international border? To answer this question, it is
necessary to determine whether the border search doctrine
applies to this information.
V.

BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE AND INFORMATION ON THE
CLOUD

If the third-party exception from Part IV does not apply
to data stored on the cloud, then what does it mean for
searches at the border? The data is not physically located at
the border, but it is easily accessible from a computer,
smartphone, tablet, or any other Internet-ready wireless device
located at the border. Furthermore, it is possible to require
passwords to gain access to cloud programs stored on wireless
devices. Do CBP and ICE officials need warrants to access such
data, or can they access it without a warrant or reasonable
suspicion at the border, as law enforcement agents within the
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction are permitted to do?
It seems logical that the border search doctrine does, in
fact, encompass information that is stored on the cloud and
accessible through an electronic device. In developing the
precedent surrounding the border search doctrine, the Supreme
195
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Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals have emphasized that
the interests of the U.S. government (in preventing contraband
and threats to security from breaching U.S. borders) outweigh
interests of individuals who cross the border.196 If courts, upon
hearing a case concerning border officials’ search of cloud data,
were to rule that accessing such information at the border falls
outside the scope of the border search doctrine, then courts
would permit U.S. entrants to circumvent DHS policies and
U.S. common law. As a result, instead of storing contraband or
evidence of illegal activity on local hard drives, savvy entrants
would store this material on the cloud, knowing that it could
not be accessed by government agents. This would “undermine
the compelling reasons that lie at the very heart of the border
search doctrine.”197
A.

Data Not Physically at the Border and Passwords

A cloud user’s data itself is stored on a server that is not
at the border but is instead in a discreet location.198 A number of
cloud service providers house servers in the Northwest;199 yet,
most service agreements do not disclose where servers are
located, and the location of smaller cloud service providers may
not be available at all.200 As a result, unlike with data on a local
hard drive, the information on the cloud does not physically
cross the border with the traveler.
Does this mean, then, that because the data is not
physically crossing the border, border officials are unable to
search such data under the border search doctrine? This seems
unlikely. In United States v. Romm, the defendant “never
legally crossed the U.S.-Canadian border” because, although he
flew to Canada, Canadian border officials refused to admit him
into the country.201 Romm argued that because of this, “he [could]
not [be] subject to a warrantless border search.”202 The fact that
Romm physically crossed the border, though illegally, prompted
the Ninth Circuit to reject this argument.203 As the court
196
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explained, “[T]he issue was whether the person searched had
physically crossed the border.”204 Therefore, by virtue of the fact
that a traveler crosses an international border, it is possible that
data on any Internet-ready device—which the traveler carries
while physically crossing the border—is searchable, regardless
of whether the data itself physically crossed the border. It is less
clear, however, how other circuit courts would interpret this
situation, since none have spoken to this issue.
What if border officials seize a traveler’s laptop or
mobile device and try to access data that is on the cloud, but
that data is password protected or encrypted? Certainly cloud
users may protect their information with passwords or
encryptions in order to keep the content of their files
confidential.205 Although the Ninth Circuit and several district
courts have upheld border searches of computer files where
border officials bypassed the password protection, courts have
not explicitly addressed the effects of password protection on
border searches.206 Nonetheless, by following the scant authority
that exists, it is plausible that passwords fail to generate
sufficient protection at the border.
Users can store passwords on their computers,
smartphones, and on certain websites in order to free
themselves from having to input the password every time they
access their cloud servers. If a password is stored in an
Internet-ready device, border officials might view this as
consent from the device’s owner to access that information.
With respect to situations where the password is not stored on
the device, courts have not yet taken issue with border agents
asking for that password or having forensic experts bypass the
security system, as in Cotterman.207 If a traveler refuses to
comply with requests for a password, the traveler’s refusal
might result in the device being detained for a longer period of
time while the agents determine how to access the
information.208 One way they might access the protected data is
by requesting it from cloud service providers—many of which
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will share a user’s information in order to comply with requests
from law enforcement.209
As a result, it is possible that passwords have little
relevance in the border search context. If passwords were truly
able to thwart access by border officials, then the ability to
password protect cloud data would undermine the justifications
of the border search doctrine—namely, preventing contraband
and terrorism from penetrating the United States.
B.

Data Can Be Accessed at the Border

This note concludes that the border search doctrine
does, in fact, apply to data stored on the cloud. The Supreme
Court has carved out a doctrine that gives the federal
government great power in searching the property of
individuals who cross an international border and enter the
United States.210 This doctrine—along with jurisprudence in the
circuit courts regarding warrantless searches of electronic
devices at the border and the directives of the CBP and ICE—
guides the conclusion that warrantless searches of data stored
on the cloud are acceptable when executed near the border. If
the purposes of the CBP and ICE directives are to prevent the
smuggling of contraband into the United States, stop those
engaged in criminal conduct, and thwart threats to national
security, then certainly data on the cloud should not be
excluded from the border search exception. It would be illogical
to allow border agents to search local hard drives of travelers’
computers without suspicion or consent, and yet preclude those
agents from opening files accessible on the same devices but
not stored locally. This would enable travelers to bypass CBP
and ICE’s search procedures, and it would permit them to
bring in the very same contraband and execute the very same
conduct that the border search doctrine is intended to prevent.
C.

Should There Be a Limit?

While this note argues that the government should have
access to data stored on the cloud since it serves the purposes
of the border search doctrine, this note does not necessarily
assert that the extension of the border search doctrine would be
209
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beneficial. Expanding the border search doctrine to a realm
that is becoming more and more ubiquitous will continue to
subvert privacy interests that are only modestly protected even
under current law. Therefore, border searches should be
limited in a way to protect privacy interests as much as
possible. This section outlines the difficulties of an expanded
border search doctrine, discusses the self-imposed limits that
already exist, and suggests limits for the future.
One problem with digital devices, as one court noted, is
that they “are not just repositories of data, but access points, or
portals, to other digital devices and data, typically obtained
through the internet or stored on a network. All data on the
internet is both separate and one.”211 In a case where the
government filed an application for a warrant for all passwords
and encryption codes for the files on the suspect’s computer,212
the court called the warrant “boundless.”213
This is made evident by the fact that the government seeks
authorization, among other things, to obtain “all passwords, password
files, test keys, encryption codes or other information necessary to
access the computer equipment, storage devices or data.” . . . This poses
a multitude of problems . . . . First, once the government has all
passwords, it is able to access a defendant’s most sensitive information.
To the extent the defendant may have medical records on-line, that
information is now available to the government. If the defendant’s wife,
who is not alleged to be involved in any criminal activity, is sending
embarrassing, private e-mail messages, that information is now
available for use by the government. If the government wants to see
what books the defendant is reading, or what movies his wife is
viewing, all of this would be fair game under the warrant presented by
the government. Moreover, if the defendant has been looking at legal
but “dirty” pictures the government will know this as well, even if the
defendant had intended to “throw them away.”214

If border
protected
travelers
bypassing
described
211

officials are able to obtain access to passwordor encrypted files stored on the cloud by asking
for their security codes or passwords—or by
them—cloud users will face the same challenges
above. Accordingly, the question becomes whether
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there should be a limit to what border officials may access and
whether their searches should be limited in scope.
One might argue that self-imposed limits to the border
search doctrine already exist. For instance, more than one
million people travel across American borders every day, but
neither CBP nor ICE has the resources to conduct searches on
every individual crossing the border.215 Instead, DHS has
emphasized
that
searches
are
typically
based
on
216
“circumstances . . . which give rise to . . . suspicion” —for
example, nervous behavior—“even though courts have repeatedly
confirmed that . . . suspicion is not required . . . .”217
Moreover, the CBP and ICE directives do require greater
protection of sensitive material.218 If border agents come across
material protected by attorney-client privilege or other sensitive
information,219 they must consult the CBP Associate or Assistant
Chief Counsel before continuing with the search.220 CBP counsel
will collaborate with the United States Attorney’s Office regarding
the privileged attorney information.221 All other sensitive business
and commercial information will be treated as confidential, and
“[i]nformation . . . determined to be protected by law as privileged
or sensitive will only be shared with federal agencies that have
mechanisms in place to protect appropriately such information.”222
ICE’s policy directive contains similar limitations.223
Furthermore, it is safe to bet that border officials cannot
access the data of travelers who do not transport computers or
other Internet-ready devices over the border, even if border
agents are capable of accessing cloud servers through their own
devices. Although the holding in Romm is based on the fact
that the person whose effects were searched physically crossed
the border,224 broadening this principle to include situations
where that person does not carry an electronic device would
exceed the bounds of the court’s holding and most likely be
unreasonable. Because the traveler is not carrying such devices,
there would be no reason for border agents even to suspect that
215
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the individual stores data on the cloud, unless law enforcement
searched cloud servers for data about every person crossing the
U.S. border. This seems unlikely, however. Accordingly, border
agents would have no basis for searching this information
through computers or electronic devices present at the border.
In his article, Professor Sales suggests that law
enforcement adopt a policy of “use limits” regarding acquired
data.225 Use limits “seek to promote privacy by limiting what the
government may do with the data it does collect, such as
restricting the sharing of information.”226 Although a limitation
such as this would not necessarily prevent the government from
gaining initial access to information that individuals wish to keep
private, it would serve as a means of reducing how much
information is shared among governmental agencies, copied, and
saved for future review. Perhaps the government could require
probable cause of possessing contraband in order for border
agents to share or copy any material. In addition, DHS should set
a solid guideline as to how long a search of a laptop or other
electronic device may last, rather than allowing a search to last
for a “reasonable period of time,”227 which in some cases could last
hours or days.228 Sales suggests that longer searches may involve a
greater violation of privacy rights because customs or
immigration officers might browse “through entirely innocent but
sensitive” data while hunting for contraband.229 Therefore,
searches of electronic devices, absent reasonable suspicion of
contraband, should be limited to a short period of time, such as
one hour or ninety minutes.
CONCLUSION
Several years ago, cloud computing was merely a buzzword that held little meaning to those who worked outside of
the technology realm. Today, however, technology experts
predict that the cloud will predominate the desktop by 2020,
meaning that most computer users will access software
applications and information through the cloud.230 The problems
225
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posed by the intersection between cloud computing and the border
search doctrine have not yet been addressed by the government or
the courts. However, it is clear that electronic files can be
searched at the border.231 So, in an effort to avoid electronic
searches at the border, travelers might turn to the cloud based on
an assumption that data on remote servers are immune from the
border search doctrine. Sex offenders might upload images or
videos to the cloud of child exploitation. Money launderers might
unknowingly store pertinent e-mail exchanges on a cloud service.
And terrorists might save information about nuclear material or
video clips of how to detonate a bomb to their clouds.232 The
proliferation of cloud computing will most definitely result in a
need for a clear border-patrol policy to be established.
Absent a clear policy, however, American jurisprudence
signifies that law enforcement officials should have the authority
to access information on the cloud by invoking the border search
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Congress and the courts
have always granted border agencies plenary power in searching
the people and property that cross international borders.233 These
border agencies serve as the first barrier in preventing
contraband and security threats from entering the United States.
Privacy rights have consistently been forced to yield to the
interests of the American government in accomplishing such
prevention, even with regard to electronic data. Precluding
border officers from accessing information that travelers store on
cloud servers, rather than on local hard drives, would severely
undermine our government’s ability to ward off smuggled and
illegal goods, and it would increase the United States’
vulnerability to terrorism. Rather, a policy granting border
officials a broad authority to search information stored on the
cloud is much more aligned with the Supreme Court and U.S.
Courts of Appeals’ border search doctrine jurisprudence.
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